Apparently that's the name of a Facebook group (yeah, I guess I'm not that creative). But before I start this post I just want to say that I haven't posted for a while because it's been so crazy busy. For anyone who doesn't know yet, not only have I started grad school (I'm getting my butt kicked!) but I also just got ENGAGED! So I'm a really happy guy, only missing the full-time job I'm looking for. But God will provide, I'm not worried.
So anyway, what's with the title? I read J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig's "Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview" this summer in preparation for the program and I thought the sections on divine providence, agency, and Molinism were very interesting.
What is Molinism? In a nutshell, it's the philosophical view that God has "middle knowledge" of the world and creates the one possible world in which the most people could be saved within the limits of their free agency. It posits that God has different kinds of knowledge: 1) natural knowledge (of everything that could happen, the possible worlds he could create), 2) middle knowledge (of everything that would happen, the feasible or not logically incompatible worlds he can create), and 3) free knowledge (foreknowledge of everything that will happen based on his creative decree).
So basically God knows everything a person would and could do in all possible circumstances in all possible worlds he could create. But there is a logical order to God's knowledge, namely, that God has middle knowledge logically (not temporally!) prior to his creative decree. I think this makes sense since middle knowledge would be useless after God's creative word. Once God sets things in motion, there is only what will be and the question of what would be given varying circumstances becomes superfluous.
The main contention then becomes that God's creative decree is based on his middle knowledge of "counterfactuals" (if it were the case that p, then it would be the case that q). Craig observes, "in so doing he also decrees how he himself would act in any set of circumstances, so that counterfactuals of divine freedom become true coincedentally with the divine decree." (562) Some people might think this sounds heretical but it completely makes sense. It just amounts to saying God is omnipotent, but he can and does limit himself in his condescension to create and care for humanity.
Contrary to Calvinism, Molinism posits that God does not act to move people's wills this way and that but rather simultaneously acts with the agent (among other things) to bring about the effect desired by that person. So the reason God is not to be held to be responsible for sin in this sense is that he did not act on the sinful person's will but only brought about the effect that the sinner desired. Craig elaborates, "In thus either willing or permitting everything that happens, therefore, God acts to produce every event in the actual world." (564) This is the doctrine of divine providence within a Molinist scheme.
Traditionally I've been a Calvinist, and still am. Still, I would probably disagree with many Calvinists about how many and which texts can be used to support the doctrine, but that's another issue. However, one cannot deny that Molinism has a certain lure to it and brings in something to the debate that Arminianism doesn't. Is middle knowledge acknowledged or even stressed in Arminianism or Calvinism? Definitely not. But does God have middle knowledge? Did Luis de Molina (the creator of Molinism) clarify our concept of God's knowledge? It seems very likely.
Thus, Molinism avoids many of the errors that Calvinists believe that Arminians make. A favorite question of mine used to be "could Judas have done otherwise?" If free will is so dang important, could Judas then and there have completely overturned God's plan of salvation? An Arminian would have to, in one sense or another, say yes.
But a Molinist would very quickly respond negatively. How can this be? Well, in other possible worlds, yes, Judas could have and would have chosen differently. But we're not talking about those feasible worlds but about the actual world that God created. So when the question is asked about whether or not Judas could do otherwise in this world, the answer is no. This is the actual world that God made and in this world, Judas will freely choose to betray Jesus.
There are many more implications of this such as it avoids making God the direct cause of evil and and it seems to preserve free will.
But there are texts in the Bible that I believe cannot be explained by this view. There are, in fact, very many moments in which God acts directly upon the hearts of people to move this way and that. This is pretty much the only objection I can really think of. I tried saying "John 6" but even that one cannot stand, it seems, in opposition to Molinism. More on John 6 on the next post.
The Value of Small Things
1 hour ago
5 comments:
Hey Sam, Looking forward to your post on John 6.
I struggle with the issue of all of those possible universes where things happen slightly differently in each. I agree that a discussion of possible, yet non-actual, events is somewhat superfluous.
In answer to the question of whether Judas could have done otherwise I would say yes and no. Yes in the sense that he was entirely free to do whatever he desired the most to do (that is, of course, in line with a reformed understanding of individual free will). However, considering the influence of Satan and the hardness of Judas heart before he realized what he was doing, it becomes clear that while he was perfectly free to do whatever he desired the most, his desires were evil and he was not free to act in contradiction of those desires. In the big picture could not have done otherwise because he did not live in a vacuum.
well, that's my 2 cents. Congratulations on getting engaged! that is so awesome! I owe you like 10 high-fives the next time I see you
I recommend Francis Turretin's critique of Middle Knowledge in his Institutes.
Very briefly, God knows all things that are possible, and God knows all things that are future. The former is logically prior to the decree, while the latter is logically dependent upon the decree. Middle knowledge suggests that God knows some things that ~would have~ been future given certain circumstances, and decreed those circumstances that would bring about the desired results. A huge problem with this (counter-reformation) doctrine, is that it supposes that there are things seen as possibly future in God's mind that He has NOT decreed. This is nonsense. Turretin should prove helpful.
Glenn: Thanks, we're very excited. :D
Now on to the substance of your comment, I have to ask why you struggle with possible universes. You didn't really elaborate so I'm curious.
And I didn't exactly say that the discussion is superfluous but that it becomes superfluous if one posits that God's middle knowledge is subsequent to his actual knowledge. Then it would become pretty useless.
Yeah, you're expressing the reformed understanding. I tend to agree with what you are saying but it doesn't really address libertarian freedom very much it seems. I think most Molinists would agree that people do what they most desire, but not that the desire therefore determines their actions.
j3rry: Nice to hear from you and thanks for commenting here. I should look into Turretin's critique then. But that is not very feasible for me now so can I ask you to defend what you seem to be saying is his view?
You basically say that a fatal flaw in Molinism is that "it supposes that there are things seen as possibly future in God's mind that He has NOT decreed." You suppose that this is nonsense but don't proceed to spell it out.
One certainly cannot just "see" that this is nonsense. Possible futures in God's mind that do not obtain in the actual world are not obviously nonsense. I would even argue that knowledge of these possible futures must be part of God's omniscience. You seem to be denying that God has knowledge of future possibles which seems, to me at least, to be an attack on his omniscience. Maybe I'm just not understanding you correctly.
Well, this thing didn't take as long to read as I thought...
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