They're not many, but these few have signifiance:
1) John 6:34-45 (see previous post) --> it says that God must draw people for them to come to him and that all whom he draws will come.
2) Romans 9 - unless you take the nations view which I would say covers half the view. I am studying it still.
3) Consider possible world B in which Hitler believes in the gospel and is transformed to live and proclaim God's kingdom. Now consider world A (for alpha) which is the actual world that God contemplated before creation and was then a possible world. This world, as we know, has Hitler becoming a loathsome and cruel person who caused the death and abuse of countless people.
Aside from all the similarities between the two worlds B and A, we know that at least on this point God could have ensured that Hitler would have been saved through his free choice. However, God does not actualize B but A. Then there is still a sense in which God decided who would be saved and who wouldn't.
It seems that Molinist would then have to argue like a Utilitarian, citing the greater good as the litmus test for God's choice of certain people. And certainly God does know the greater good.
But my point is that when seen in this light, Molinism appears to entail exactly what it condemns in the Calvinist system. Merely saying that free choice determines people's destiny does very little to explain this.
4) I'm not sure that I agree with a Libertarian account of agency (though I do lean that way despite my Calvinist view). And even if I did, it doesn't answer objection 3 above.
5) Even though environment is not really causally sufficient, one can always bring up the objection that God is, to some extent, responsible for placing people in certain environments. Heck, even natural disasters that God causes or permits create an environment in which certain people will accept or reject him. A Molinist would have to explain why God is not responsible for creating certain environments even though people's free will remains intact.
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Thanks for unraveling my rather amateurish comments to your last post. I see here that you have pointed out a couple of the points I saw myself as making:
[But my point is that when seen in this light, Molinism appears to entail exactly what it condemns in the Calvinist system.]
That is exactly my point regarding my puppet-stage comment to your last post.
[Merely saying that free choice determines people's destiny does very little to explain this.]
This coincides with my comment about the theological hat-trick: despite all evidence to the contrary, we will still call this freedom.
And I think I now get why God can’t be the author of sin. It’s because the Molinist starts with the assumption of libertarian free-will. Does this mean that God can do anything he wants regarding the circumstance of a person (i.e. allowing them to be brought up in a gang; framed for murder and thrown in prison; molested by parents etc.) but when they react to those circumstances in a sinful manner, they are to accept the entire responsibility for their actions because it was they who sinned?
It would seem that the problem here is that that they have been set up for failure. If a parent knows his child loves junk food he can either leave candy around the house and set his child up for getting cavities, or remove all candy in order to avoid possible cavities. When the child gets cavities common sense tells us it is the parent who is at fault, not the child who can only do what he desires. And how much greater is the gap between God and man than between a man and his child? Yet God retains no responsibility for propping us up for failure?
God could have, if he really wanted all to be saved, chosen the world where the Fall never happened, where sinless Adam was without an environment that pushed him towards sin (the only factor could have been the environment since he had no evil desires within him that would cause him to freely sin). Remembering that God wishes for none to perish, does the Molinist have an answer for why God did otherwise? How could any answer avoid putting constraints on omnipotence?
Hey Jason, nice to hear from you.
[...despite all evidence to the contrary, we will still call this freedom.]
Well, technically I guess you may be right. If to have free will is to be free from external, causal, necessary factors, then God's realization of any world may overthrow that claim. So it only remains libertarian free will insofar as we don't bring God's actualization of certain environments into the picture. I would hesitate to say this for certain though.
[And I think I now get why God can’t be the author of sin...Does this mean that God can do anything he wants regarding the circumstance of a person...but when they react to those circumstances in a sinful manner, they are to accept the entire responsibility for their actions because it was they who sinned?]
That does seem to be the case within Molinism. They would say this is the case because the environment did not determine anything since it is no causally sufficient, but it is the person that chose one thing or the other. It is the substance that is to blame, not the conditions that the substance found itself in.
[When the child gets cavities common sense tells us it is the parent who is at fault, not the child who can only do what he desires. And how much greater is the gap between God and man than between a man and his child? Yet God retains no responsibility for propping us up for failure?]
This is my question exactly. Of course, we must always remember that God does have certain prerogatives like taking the life of a person or an animal. Still, your illustration is an example I would fine posing to the Molinist.
[God could have, if he really wanted all to be saved, chosen the world where the Fall never happened, where sinless Adam was without an environment that pushed him towards sin (the only factor could have been the environment since he had no evil desires within him that would cause him to freely sin).]
Actually, it is not required that Adam possessed moral perfection for him to be "good" in the way Genesis teaches. It can be argued that the only possible morally perfect being is God and to create another morally perfect being would be to create another God which is impossible. So it may be that even though Adam did not have a sinful nature, his sin could have stemmed from both himself and his environment concurrently.
[Remembering that God wishes for none to perish, does the Molinist have an answer for why God did otherwise? How could any answer avoid putting constraints on omnipotence?]
Well, some people (like myself) would not necessarily agree that God wants every single individual to be saved. It can be argued that the passages commonly taught to teach that idea are actually speaking about classes of people.
But more to the point, a Molinist may respond by saying that it all depends on how God's omnipotence is construed. If you define it as God being able to do anything whatsoever, then your definition is inadequate.
But if it is defined in such a way that allows God to do all things that are logically possible, then maybe a case can be made that God's omnipotence is compatible with not being able to create a world with free will. So if one can show that is logically impossible for God to create a world where free will is denied and in which moral responsibility remains intact, then no redefinition of God's omnipotence is needed.
I've read about how certain people have tried to do this and it's actually pretty persuasive. It all falls under how nobody really believes anymore (including atheists) that God and evil are logically incompatible. Now the argument is that is it improbable. In the same way, it may have been impossible for God to have his creatures truly choose him while at the same time denying free will.
BTW, Jason, tell me a little about yourself. I see in your profile that you are a liberal studies major and have studied philosophy. What are your interests within these fields?
Hi, happend to see this post. while i'm not yet sold to molinism, i think the points you mentioned has some possible molinist answers.
Possible answers to your points are:
1. It could be that God is drawing only those people whom he foresaw will come if he draws them in a particular world. i am not sure if under molinism God could be very certain about their coming though.
2. even if you don't take the nations view, it could be that God chose the individual Jacob, because he saw Jacob would have accepted his grace. And it could be that Esau and Pharaoh are transworld depraved, hence God couldnt do anything much about them. Will cover that in next point.
3. I think William Lane Craig proposed a concept called transworld depravity. ie, there could be some souls who will not turn to God under any circumstance, ie in any possible world. He proposes that God only instantiated these type of souls in the case of the non elect. Hence there is no possible world in which Hitler (assuming he is a transworld depraved being) would come to God and hence God is just in instantiating him and damning him.
4. i'm with you. not clear in libertarian position.
5. Assuming transworld depravity for all lost souls, this point is gone. Any environment would not have saved them. Yet some environment would not have saved the elect also, hence God put the elect in favourable environments.
Forgive in advance. I'm new to molinism, hence i may have voiced some foolish thoughts.
Pramod,
Thanks for commenting.
1. It could be that God is drawing only those people whom he foresaw will come if he draws them in a particular world.
The point of John 6 though is that every individual that God draws, will end up coming to God and gain salvation. There is no room for some of them failing to do so. What if God foresaw anything, John 6 seems to say that he foresaw every single person drawn to come to Him. So how can God be drawing all people in Molinism? Wouldn't they all be saved? That's what doesn't make sense to me.
2. even if you don't take the nations view, it could be that God chose the individual Jacob, because he saw Jacob would have accepted his grace. And it could be that Esau and Pharaoh are transworld depraved, hence God couldnt do anything much about them.
Romans 9 seems to me to be a bit stronger than that God left people to their own devices. "I will have mercy on whom I have mercy" and raising up Pharaoh "for this very purpose", objects of wrath "prepared for destruction". This doesn't just seem to be talking about transworld depravity (obviously Paul wasn't thinking about that) but God's action in addition to that.
3. transworld depravity. ie, there could be some souls who will not turn to God under any circumstance, ie in any possible world...God only instantiated these type of souls in the case of the non elect. Hence there is no possible world in which Hitler (assuming he is a transworld depraved being) would come to God and hence God is just in instantiating him and damning him.
Two things on this: 1) so then it must follow that God did not even draw him? (John 6) 2) This does not seem to evade the charge leveled against Calvinism, that is, that God is unjust in "instantiating" certain souls that never had a chance. Sure, they're different flavors of the same problem (and they can be answered), but it does not seem to me to be that different. So then, why despise Calvinism so much?
5. Assuming transworld depravity for all lost souls, this point is gone. Any environment would not have saved them. Yet some environment would not have saved the elect also, hence God put the elect in favourable environments.
First point is correct and second point seems plausible. But, as above, I would question how much better this account is than Calvinism which is derided in much of philosophical academia. It just seems to offer very little that's different when it counts.
Forgive in advance. I'm new to molinism, hence i may have voiced some foolish thoughts.
Hey, I'm nowhere near an expert on this so don't worry about that.
Please read along side with your points. i have not copied the main text for saving space.
1. Me>>ok, what if a molinist suggest that God is not drawing all with the kind of drawing he says in John 6 (there may be other general graces he gives to all), but God is "John6-drawing" only the elect. And he places the elect in favourable environments so that they freely repond positively to his drawing (hence john 6 is taken care of - all whom he draws comes to Jesus). This raises the question of justice to non elect. I think a molinist can evade that apparent problem by suggesting the elect is transworld depraved, therefore in all justice they should be put to hell. more about this in points below.
2. Me>>Yes, i agree that Romans 9 doesnt specifically talk about transworld depravity. But that is a different issue. The issue i tried to handle is, does molinism have an answer to all the objections raised in this post. i suggested yes. So assuming molinism to be true, whether it can handle Romans 9 is my concern now. Whether Romans 9 teaches molinism or not is a different issue altogether. Provided molinism is a valid option of interpreting difficult texts...
Your concerns in Romans 9 can be interpreted this way.
You>>"I will have mercy on whom I have mercy" - Me>>Yes it is God who ultimately instantiates souls and puts the elect in favourable circumstance. Therefore its God's decision who in which country or place should be saved. The elect may not be saved in a different environment (for eg. in a country where he never hears the gospel in a persuasive manner). So its God's double mercy to the elect for their salvation - first in giving them chance to be saved, second in putting them in very favourable circumstance. they probably would have messed up with first mercy alone. the non-elect will mess up anyhow.
You>>... raising up Pharaoh "for this very purpose", objects of wrath "prepared for destruction". - Me>>Yes, i take that the soul of Pharaoh is transworld depraved. Hence God raised that soul to be ruler Pharaoh as his object of wrath in the pre-exodus miracles. God raised him to show His wrath, Yes; but the choice to be depraved was completely Pharaoh's. It is his souls decision to be depraved (in any world). Hence God is still just in punishing him with just punishment.
3.
You>>Two things on this: 1) so then it must follow that God did not even draw him? (John 6)
Me>>I think of two options here:
1st) Yes, i submit that God didnt draw him with the drawing mentioned in John 6 which allows a submitting soul to respond positively (based on his free choice to submit). But that won't make the non-elect excusable, since they won't come to God under any circumstance anyhow. Therefore we can suggest God doesnt bother about them to give that kind of an effort since they won't come to him anyhow. He might have given them some common graces to bring them to faith if they had submitted to it. But he didnt draw them with John6-drawing since they would have reject that anyhow. So all whom God draws are the elect and they come to him.
In other words, John 6 is a more powerful version of grace to the soul which he only gave to cooperating souls.
2nd) This drawing of John 6 can consist of two parts
(a) a genaral grace of God which enables a cooperating soul to come to faith
PLUS
(b) the environment a soul is put to be in by God.(which is also a part of drawing, since it helps in salvation)
Using (a) and (b) God draws with efficacy. Now, i suggest that God gave part (a) to all souls and hence his justice is vindicated. All could have come to salvation if they cooperated.
Given, part (a) of drawing alone, probably not all elect comes to him. God sees all possible worlds and puts the remaining elect in extremely favourable circumstance giving them part (b), since he wants their salvation at any cost.
For part b, it is only reasonable to give a very favourable circumstance to the souls who will cooperate with that circumstance.God is not under any obligation to give part b to non elect whom he knows will reject him even if he gives. But remember, they are not punished on this hypothetical rejection of God had they been given part b. They are punished because they rejected him in the actual world with part a which is given to all. To give them the best circumstance in which they will anyhow reject God is not God's obligation and it no way affects his justice. Their rebellion in real world is enough for putting them to hell.
So, either of these solutions, seems to solve the problem for me.
You>> 2) This does not seem to evade the charge leveled against Calvinism, that is, that God is unjust in "instantiating" certain souls that never had a chance.
Me>>I don't think so. Is not justice the giving back what is due to a responsible soul based on his or her free choices (atleast a simplified definition)? God's instantiation of the soul has nothing to do with justice. Its God's freedom to create any soul; its not a question of justice, but a question of freedom there. Its the soul who decides to reject God in any circumstance. Hence God is both free to create, and just in creating and punishing based on the souls free choice to pursue sin. And remember, under the version i am defending, enviroment will not help the non-elect. environement will only help the elect.
My only concern with this version is how could this view take care of God as an optimally loving being. Why did God instantiate non-elect, according to my understanding is not a question of justice, but can raise serious questions against His optimal love. I think molinists have some answers for that, such as non-elect helping the salvation of the elect etc, but its not immediately obvious to me. That is where the molinist position is becoming near to Calvinist position for me.
You>>Sure, they're different flavors of the same problem (and they can be answered), but it does not seem to me to be that different. So then, why despise Calvinism so much?
Me>>I'm more near to Calvinism exegetically. But what i am thinking is there is molinist answers to your points. Calvinism cannot easily evade these, since a Calvinist God could have saved even the non elect of the actual world, provided he decided to elect them before the foundations of the world and draws them with John6-drawing. This is not possible in my molinist version where even God cannot save the transworld depraved non elect. Hence they seem to be more than different flavours.
5. Me>>It's different from Calvinism as mentioned in the previous point.
You>>Hey, I'm nowhere near an expert on this so don't worry about that.
>>Yeay, thanks. i am not a molinist, but i thought molinism is probably powerful enough to evade these charges you raised.
For 3rd point,
please read my 2nd option part (b) as:
(b) the very favourable environment a soul is put to be in by God for their salvation.
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