Now just to warn fellow exegetically minded theologians out there, this is not going to be an argument from the text for Molinism. All I have done is reflect upon the implications of Molinism and seen whether or not certain texts are contradictory; this is more like philosophical analysis of the text. The main question I'm trying to answer is this: can John 6:35-45 be reconciled with Molinism given the philosophical system of Molinism?
There seem to be three main points in John 6 that concern our topic (let me know if I missed any):
1) All that the Father gives to Jesus will come to him (v. 37a).
2) Those who do not believe do so because the Father has not given them to Jesus, which is merely saying the opposite of point 1 (v.36-37a). No one is able (look at Greek) to come to Jesus unless the Father draws that person (v. 44a) and they have heard and learned from him (v. 45b).
3) The will of the Father is that all whom he has given to Jesus will not be lost (v. 39a-b), will be raised up on the last day (v. 39) and will "certainly not" be cast out (v. 37b). All those the Father draws - and therefore come to him (see point 2) - will be raised up on the last day, i.e. resurrected (v. 44b).
So basically, 1) The Father gives certain people to Jesus and 2) draws them internally so that 3) they must believe, and 4) these will necessarily continue to believe such that they will be resurrected unto eternal life. 5) No one is able to participate in this "chain of salvation" unless they are first drawn by the Father.
Verse 44 seems to be the strongest collective statement of all these points. For this reason I see verse 44 as possibly the central verse for our material. Now let's work off points 1, 2, 4, and 5 (let's leave 3 for last) in the bold text above to see if they are compatible with Molinism (look two posts back if you forgot what Molinism is):
1) No qualms here. Arminians would have a difficult time with this point because the text is strongly implying that only those few people that the Father gives to Jesus will believe and have salvation. So what of the rest, are they drawn as well? Well, I don't think there's any way to draw that out from the passage. Molinism can be reconciled here since in the actual world that God created, the Father may "give" to his Son those whom he knew would accept through their free will when considering all possible worlds. If you're having trouble agreeing with this, remember the point I'm trying to make is that there is no inconsistency here. Don't import your whole theological system at this point.
2) No disagreement here either since in the actual world God created, he is drawing those whom he knew would accept anyway. The rest would kind of be a lost cause since God knew that in this possible world (which is actual) they wouldn't even accept the gospel.
4) This is also compatible with Molinism since the Father preserves the people that believe through internal transformation. What this means is that they are given the witness of the Spirit and their whole person is transformed such that they will continue to believe with their free will intact. The transformation itself was allowed by the person through his free agency.
5) Pretty much point 2 above restated, so there's not much more to add. This is compatible with Molinism.
Now on to point three, that "they must believe":
3) This is admittedly the point at where I see Molinism falter. The contention here is that those who are drawn by the Father must believe. But then we can restate this (philosophically) as: the Father's "drawing" is a necessary and sufficient cause of any person's belief and salvation. But let's hypothetically take this cause away, does that person still believe? The fairly obvious answer is no. So if in this actual world, God withdrew the cause of belief, how is it that people would believe? They wouldn't. This is not a case where one must attempt to discern the causes of belief; in this case, we can properly speak of the cause of belief. Here's the main point: if God knew the possible future of this world before he created it, he would have seen people believing because he had drawn them.
However, a Molinist could argue as follows (I'm just making all this stuff up, I'm not actually sure what a Molinist would say): of course God would have seen this, before creation he was trying to determine which possible world would yield more believers. So any possible world God would have looked at would have been one in which he was the cause of belief through his "drawing" in conjunction with free will.
But then, I say, that seems to entail (along with the points above) that God realized a world in which he knew certain people would not believe because he would not cause belief in them. How can I say this...well, how can God know that they would not believe in this possible world if he did not consider even "drawing" them? I don't think I'm being clear, but I'm having a hard time saying what I'm thinking.
Last try: if he could draw those he gave to his Son, and bring them to salvation necessarily, without disrupting their free agency (Molinist view remember?), how is it that he couldn't realize a world in which he did this to all people? This specific point, I believe, appears to be a fatal blow to Molinism. But I really do have to research and think more.
Well, I've gone on long enough. I'm really amazed if you made it this far, but I'm happy I was able to organize my thoughts way more than they were before. My next post will deal with a list of my misgivings about Molinism.
The Value of Small Things
1 hour ago
2 comments:
The Molinist can posit all the possible worlds he likes, as you said earlier the fact remains that Judas COULD NOT have done otherwise in THIS world. Thus, in this, the only actualized world, the Molinist would agree that there is, was, and will ever be only one Judas Iscariot and his actions were not free but predetermined by God without his consent and hand-picked for placement on a puppet-stage manufactured to realize divine ends at the price of human freedom.
Consider this. If God wanted to accomplish the feat of Judas betraying Jesus, then he would have had to forego realizing the world in which Judas would have actually fought to save Jesus from the Pharisees. But wait! What does God have against Judas anyways? Why is he already bent on setting Judas up for failure? Judas doesn’t have a chance in Heaven, but through a nifty theological hat trick we will still call him free.
Of course not! If one cannot choose his own destiny then one is not free.
And is God not the author of sin? Given effect X, where X is ‘the betrayal of Jesus by Judas Iscariot’, the Molinist will agree that God knows both the necessary and sufficient circumstances, Z, that will cause X to occur. Thus, using his omnipotent causal knowledge, if God were to cause Z so as to produce effect X, God would be the cause of X. If X is considered by God to be a sin and God causes Z to produce X, then God is the cause of sin. Otherwise a murderer is not to be held responsible for the death of one he pushes off a cliff. For merely creating the nessesary and sufficient causes(a falling body hitting sharp rocks) would not make one responsible for the effect of a dead body.
Yes, Judas could not have done otherwise in this world. But you are mistaken in saying that it follows that his actions were not free but predetermined; a Molinist WOULD NOT agree with that statement. That is because even though in this world Judas can't do otherwise, this is due to his libertarian free will and so he can't do otherwise in a free sense.
Not sure how you got the imagery of the puppet-stage because I'm not talking about Calvinism but Molinism. I'd like for you to elaborate on why you mentioned it in this case because I don't see the connection.
It's not a "theological hat trick" that we can still call him free. A Molinist would say that Judas's action was free by definition because he was the first cause of his action. In the Molinist system, God did not act upon Judas to have that desire but it arose out of Judas's evil heart. Therefore he still retains libertarian freedom. You must try and see this from the Molinist perspective.
In a Molinist view, he chooses his destiny through his free agency, so he is still free.
On your explanation of the causal factors leading up to Jesus' betrayal, one must keep in mind the nuances that characterize the Molinist view of God providence. Yes, God is omniscient and knows the necessary and sufficient causes, Z, that will cause X to occur.
Your assumption that God's primary causal activity is necessarily involved in that knowledge, however, is not in line with Molinist thinking. In other words, your objection seems to amount to saying that God's knowledge of the future is his knowledge of what he does in the future. But this is precisely what the Molinist rejects, citing Middle Knowledge as the knowledge of counterfactual conditionals in which free agency is determinant.
Thus, he actualizes Z Prime, which involves the libertarianly free decisions that lead to X, the effect. Thus, your argument that God is the author of evil seems to fall short of attacking Molinism, though they can be directed at Calvinism. I wouldn't agree with you concerning Calvinism if you did, I'm just saying that it would be proper to voice that opinion in that context.
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